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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the role of insider ownership in 
the dividend policy and the leverage decision of the firm. 
An asymmetric information model is developed with the 
proportion of equity owned by insiders, dividend payout, and 
debt as signals of firm value. Analysis of the model yields 
testable hypotheses that insider ownership is negatively 
related to the payout and debt ratio of a firm. Cross-
sectional regression analysis of leverage and payout ratio 
on the insider ownership is performed to test for the 
hypotheses. 
The hypothesis that firms with large insider holdings 
have lower leverage than firms with small insider holdings 
is a joint test of the signalling and risk aversion 
explanations. An examination of the systematic and non-
systematic risk across closely and widely held firms is used 
to differentiate between the alternative explanations. 
The empirical evidence is consistent with the hypotheses 
that closely held firms have lower leverage and payout 
ratios compared to widely held firms. Two insider ownership 
variables: CI) percentage of insider ownership and (2) 
number of insiders are used to measure ownership control. 
The percentage of insider ownership is negatively related to 
the payout and leverage while the number of insiders has a 
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positive relationship. These relationships are stable over 
time. The results also indicate that industry factors are 
significant in explaining variations in payout and leverage 
ratios across firms. 
A significant positive relationship is observed between 
insider ownership and the non-systematic risk of a firm. 
This finding tends to reject the risk aversion explanation, 
as firms with large non-systematic risk have higher insider 
shareholdings than firms with small non-systematic risk, 
after controlling for size. The relationship between 
insider ownership and systematic risk is negative, which is 
consistent with lower leverage for such firms. 
Finally, the study finds conflicting evidence for 
dividends and leverage being "substitute signals" of firm 
value. In some industries analyzed, payout and leverage 
ratios are positively related while in other industries the 
relationship is negative. The main objective of this study 
is to provide empirical evidence in the divdend policy and 




Traditional corporate finance has developed several mod­
els in capital structure and dividend policy but lacks a 
generally accepted theory. Myers (1984) points out that we 
have little understanding of capital structure and of how 
firms choose the proportion of debt or equity they issue. 
Both the target debt ratio and the lowest cost of capital 
theories offer unsatisfactory explanations of the cross-sec-
tion of debt to equity ratios observed in industry. In div­
idend policy, several studies provide evidence that dividend 
changes convey information.1 Black (1976) looks at both the 
supply and demand sides of the dividend problem and con­
cludes that there is no satisfactory explanation of how 
firms set their dividends. Despite subsequent efforts by 
numerous researchers, dividends continue to remain a puz­
zle. 2 
1 Studies that provide empirical evidence include: Aharony 
and Swary (1980),Asquith and Mullins (1983), and Brickley 
(1983). 
2 A partial list includes Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), 
(1982), Miller and Scholes (1982), Hess (1982), and Eades, 
Hess, and Kim (1984). 
In their landmark papers, Modigliani and Miller 
(1958),(1961) show that, assuming perfect capital markets 
with symmetric information, the value of the firm is inde­
pendent of its capital structure and dividend policy deci­
sions. With the introduction of taxes and tax subsidies, 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that an optimal firm spe­
cific capital structure exists. The introduction of bank­
ruptcy costs also produces an optimal capital structure 
equilibrium. Altman (1984), provides evidence for signifi­
cant bankruptcy costs. However, Haugen and Senbet (1978) 
argue that bankruptcy costs associated with liquidation are 
not relevant to the capital structure decision. 
For the dividend policy decision, Miller and Scholes 
(1978) argue that, with taxes, "home made leverage" can be 
used to avoid paying taxes on dividend income, thus rein­
forcing the dividend irrelevance argument. However, Modi­
gliani (1982) argues that as long as the tax rate on divi­
dend income exceeds that on capital gains, dividend payouts 
will reduce the value of the firm. This suggests that firms 
should not pay any dividends. The issue remains controvei— 
sial as Peterson, Peterson, and Ang (1985) estimate that in­
dividuals do not shield dividend income from higher taxation 
as suggested by Miller and Scholes (1978). 
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Several researchers have suggested agency costs and in­
formational asymmetry as determinants of optimal dividend 
policy and capital structure.3 Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that firms will choose an optimal capital structure 
that minimizes the agency costs of the firm. An optimal 
capital structure equilibrium could be achieved by minimiz­
ing the agency costs of debt and equity. The existence of 
optimal debt ratios may also be explained by balancing the 
tax benefit of debt versus the increased agency costs in­
curred by the use of leverage. 
Rozeff (1982) suggests that an optimal dividend policy is 
one obtained by a tradeoff between higher flotation costs of 
raising external funds and the reduced agency costs when a 
firm increases dividend payout. He argues that increased 
dividend payouts will be accompanied by a need to raise ex­
ternal capital to finance the firm's projects. For the firm 
to receive these funds at the lowest cost, management must 
disclose information regarding the use of these funds, de­
creasing the informational asymmetry between management and 
security holders. Easterbrook (1984), in a similar manner, 
argues that dividends provide a low cost monitoring function 
for investors and thus reduce agency costs. 
3 A detailed discussion on the sources of agency costs is 
provided in Chapter III. 
With asymmetric information, Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya 
(1979) use similar approaches to develop models that show 
debt and dividends may be used as signals to reduce informa­
tion asymmetry. More recently, Sarig (1985) develops the 
"substitute signal" hypothesis in which both dividends and 
leverage may be used as substitute signals of firm value. 
In Sarig and Scott (1985) empirical evidence is presented in 
favor of this hypothesis. The authors find a positive cor— 
relation between dividend yield and leverage for an aggre­
gate sample of 894 NYSE firms. However, the study provides 
no control for the difference in investment opportunity set 
across industries. 
Several signalling equilibria models have been developed 
using leverage and dividends as signals, assuming that a 
firm's insidei—managers know more about the value of its as­
sets and investment opportunities than outside investors.4 
Leland and Pyle (1977) show that the proportion of the equi­
ty owned by the insidei—managers is itself a signal to out­
side investors. 
The approach adopted in this paper is similar to the one 
suggested by Myers (1984): 
4 Ross (1977) and Heinkel (1982) develop equilibria models 
using leverage as a signal. Bhattacharya (1979), Miller 
and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985) show equi­
libria with dividends as a signal. 
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"We should start with a story based on asymmetric infor— 
mation and expand it by adding only those elements of 
the static tradeoff which have clear empirical support." 
In this study, an asymmetric information framework is devel­
oped with three signals of firm value: CI) the percentage 
of equity held by ownei—managers, (2) leverage, and (3) the 
dividend payout. It is hypothesized that once ownership is 
determined endogenously, closely held firms will have a 
lesser incentive to signal through leverage and dividends 
than firms which are widely held, since insider ownership is 
itself a signal. Other motivations such as risk aversion on 
the part of insiders as alternative explanations of the hy­
pothesis are considered. Myers (1984) suggests that if a 
firm's informational asymmetry is reduced it will prefer to 
issue equity over debt. Since insider ownership is a proxy 
for the degree of information asymmetry, in the Myers and 
Majluf (1984) framework, firms with high insider ownership 
(low information asymmetry) should have low debt in their 
capital structures. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
in the present study. Since the issue can be examined em­
pirically, a cross-sectional analysis is performed to detej— 
mine the influence of ownership structure on the dividend 
and leverage decisions of the firm. 
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The main objectives of this study are: 
( 1 )  T o  d e v e l o p  a  m o d e l  i n  t h e  a s y m m e t r i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r a m e ­
work that provides testable hypotheses for the relation­
ship between the proportion of equity held by insiders 
and the dividend and leverage decisions of the firm. 
(2) To develop a methodology that tests the theoretical hy­
potheses related to insider ownership. 
(3) To provide further empirical evidence on the possibility 
of capital structure and dividend policy being comple­
mentary signals. 
A survey of existing theoretical and empirical studies is 
presented in Chapter II. This is followed by a more de­
tailed discussion of the agency and asymmetric information 
issues involved in this study. An objective function is de­
rived in a multi-dimensional signalling framework, and te­
stable implications are developed. In Chapter IV, the own­
ership and financial data used in this study are described. 
The empirical methodology and construction of variables used 
to test the hypotheses that insider ownership has a signifi­
cant effect on the firm's dividend policy and capital struc­
ture decisions are also included in this chapter. 
Chapter V presents the results of the empirical tests. 
The initial analysis uses analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
non-parametric statistical tests to determine differences in 
payout and leverage ratios across closely and widely held 
firms. A significant difference is observed in the aggre­
gate data for payout ratios. For debt, although the leve?— 
age ratios for closely held firms are lower than for widely 
held firms, the difference is not statistically significant. 
The results of these tests provide some evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis that closely held firms have lower dividends 
and leverage than widely held firms. 
Cross-sectional regressions of leverage and payout ratios 
on the percentags of insider ownership suggest a significant 
negative relationship. Results of the tests to determine 
whether industry factors affect the firm's leverage and div­
idends are consistent with earlier findings of Bradley, Jar— 
rell, and Kim (1984) who show a significant increase in ex­
planatory power when industry dummy variables are introduced 
in a linear regression model for the determinants of lever— 
age. However, there is still a lack of explanatory power, 
especially for the leverage results, suggesting that factors 
other than ownership, financial characteristics, and indus­
try effects play a role in the determination of leverage and 
dividends. 
The study provides evidence in favor of the role of lev­
erage as a signal of firm value. The hypothesis that lower 
leverage for closely held firms may be motivated by risk 
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aversion on the part of ownet—managers is rejected in cross-
sectional tests o£ ownership with the firm's systematic and 
non-systematic risk. Empirical findings of the study sug­
gest that ownership is a significant factor in the determi­
nation of debt and dividend decisions of a firm. 
Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a survey of previous relevant re­
search in the asymmetric information and agency cost area. 
The first part of the chapter concentrates on a review of 
the theoretical models and the role of signalling in capital 
structure and dividend policy equilibrium of the firm. A 
discussion of empirical studies in this area is included in 
the latter part of the chapter. 
The models discussed assume an information asymmetry in 
capital markets, with insiders having superior information 
regarding the end of period firm value. Akerlof (1970) 
shows that with asymmetric information, a signalling mecha­
nism must exist in order to achieve market equilibrium for a 
product. The models, however, differ in the choice of fi­
nancial variables used to signal firm value (divi­
dend, leverage, and insider ownership) and whether the signal 
is costless (non-dissipative) or costly. For costly sig­
nalling, the cost function must satisfy the Spence (1973) 
condition that the marginal cost of signalling is positive 
and decreasing with respect to the true determinant of val­
ue . 
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2.1 DIVIDEND POLICY AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
The existing models of asymmetric information in the div­
idend signalling area are one dimensional in structure. 
These models consider dividends as the only signal of firm 
value but are different in the cost functions used to arrive 
at an equilibrium. 
Bhattacharya (1979) develops an asymmetric information 
model with dividend policy as a signal of the future cash 
flows. The true distribution of these cash flows is known 
only to the insidei—managers. To arrive at a signalling 
equilibrium the author considers two costs: (1) the tax dif­
ferential between the capital gains and dividend income tax 
and (2) the cost of additional financing needed (if any), to 
pay this dividend. The second cost assumes that a firm will 
signal through dividends even if it has to raise additonal 
funds by issuing new equity. 
Miller and Rock (1985) develop a model for the value of 
the firm under differential information. The cost of sig­
nalling in their study is the loss of funds for real invest­
ment due to the increased dividends. In the Miller and Rock 
equilibrium, the firm will have a lower level of investment 
under dividend signalling than under the full information 
model. Among the conclusions for dividend policy, the au­
thors find that the payout ratio should be an increasing 
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function of the proportion of shares held by the "outside" 
investors, although no empirical evidence is presented. 
Analysis of the model also yields the empirically testable 
hypothesis that unexpected dividend and earnings changes 
convey information. 
John and Williams (1985) consider a dissipative signall­
ing model with differential taxes on dividends and capital 
gains. An equilibrium is established by the balancing of an 
increase in stock price due to the dividend signal versus 
the loss due to incremental taxes on the dividends. In the 
study the authors assume that the firm declares a dividend 
only if the demand for cash by the shareholders and the firm 
exceeds the supply of cash. 
2.2 LEVERAGE AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Ross (1977), uses the manager's compensation schedule to 
arrive at a signalling equilibrium. The manager is rewarded 
at the end of the period for a correct signal while a penal­
ty is imposed if the firm goes bankrupt. It is hypothesized 
that managers use leverage to convey information about a 
firm's future earnings. The empirical implication of the 
model is that firm value will be an increasing function of 
leverage. 
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Heinkel (1982) develops a costless signalling model using 
risky debt as a signal of firm value. A necessary condition 
for stable costless equilibrium in the model is that the 
face value of debt is an increasing function of insider own­
ership. Heinkel (1982) derives a one dimensional signalling 
equilibrium in which riskier, more valuable firms have larg­
er amounts of debt financing. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) use asymmetric information to de­
rive conclusions regarding the supply of debt or equity se­
curities in the capital markets. The authors argue that 
managers with superior information will know the true value 
of the firm's stock and issue only stock when it is overva­
lued by the market. Otherwise, they will issue debt. The 
market recognizes this and views new stock issues as neg­
ative information and discounts the stock price accordingly. 
Thus firms forego positive net present value projects if the 
net present value of the project being financed is less than 
the amount the issue is discounted by investors. Since the 
discount is dependent upon the information asymmetry about 
the project's outcome, Myers and Majluf suggest that if the 
information asymmetry is eliminated or reduced for a short 
period of time, firms will tend to only issue stock over 
that period. One testable implication of this observation 
is that when firms have a reduced information asymmetry due 
to high insider ownership, one should observe a lower level— 
age. 
13 
Recently, Sarig (1985) has developed a model in which 
dividends and leverage are substitute signals of firm value. 
The model is based on both dividends and debt being a com­
mitment by the firm's management to maintain a level of fu­
ture cash outlays in the form of dividend payouts and intei— 
est payments on debt. The two costs considered to arrive at 
an equilibrium are: (1) the bankruptcy cost of debt and (2) 
the additional cost of financing required to meet the divi­
dend payments. It is hypothesized that leverage is used by 
the firm until the marginal cost of a deviation from the op­
timal capital structure of the firm exceeds the marginal 
cost of additional dividends. The model is similar to that 
hypothesized in the present study as it establishes a multi­
dimensional signalling equilibrium. 
2.3 INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a signalling equilibrium 
using the insider's ownership as a signal of firm value. 
The authors argue that a manager retaining a large propoi— 
tion of the equity of a firm sends a positive signal about 
his expectations of future expected cash flows. The signal 
is costly due to the loss of personal diversification by the 
manager. Downs and Heinkel (1982) provide empirical evi­
dence in favor of the Leland and Pyle hypothesis by studying 
the proportion of equity retained by owners after a firm 
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goes public. The authors find that firm value is an in­
creasing function of the proportion of equity retained at 
the time of going public. 
2.4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Until recently there has been little empirical evidence 
on asymmetric information models. Even today, there is lit­
tle work that relates ownership, dividends, and leverage as 
signals of firm value. A majority of the empirical work is 
on the influence of information asymmetry on observed stock 
price reaction to new issues of debt and equity. 
Rozeff (1982) uses a cross-sectional test, similar to the 
present study, on a model that relates dividend payout to 
the fraction of equity held by insiders. The author finds a 
significantly negative relationship between percentage in­
sider ownership and dividend payout. However, there are 
several problems with the study that warrant further inves­
tigation. Some problems with and omissions from the Rozeff 
study are presented below: 
(1 ) The study did not control for size of the firm, thus 
the ownership variable may have been a proxy for size. 
(2) The regression variables are estimated by averaging data 
over several years. This may introduce a bias in the re­
sults. The payout ratio, for example, has been aggre­
15 
gated over six years. The present study uses annual 
payouts for dividends thus eliminating any bias.® 
(3) The insider ownership data collected from the Value Line 
Investment Survey are only approximate data in many cas­
es, which may have biased the results.6 
(4) There is no control for variables such as the investment 
opportunity set that vary across industries and may sig­
nificantly influence the dividend policy and leverage 
decisions of the firm. This study controls for varia­
tions in investment opportunites by employing both intra 
and inter industry tests. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 
(1984) find a significant industry effect in cross-sec-
tional tests for leverage. 
(5) The study does not control for the number of insiders 
and thus does not distinguish between a firm that has a 
large percentage owned by one insider and a firm with 
many "small" insider shareholders. 
5 It is assumed that the one year payout is the equilibrium 
or steady state value. 
6 For a comparison of the Value Line and the Disclosure data 
used in this study, see Appendix A. A random sample of 99 
firms was chosen for the comparison. About 30 percent of 
the observations from Value Line are significantly diffei— 
ent from the Disclosure data, although the means are not 
significantly different. A similar percent of the data 
was stated as approximate in Value Line. For example the 
insider ownership data for Jamesway corporation is given 
in Value Line as "about 20 percent". 
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Several recent studies examine security price reaction 
around new security issues. The evidence presented suggests 
that one explanation for the negative price reaction to new 
issues is the information asymmetry between managers and 
outside securityholders. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) use 
stock price reaction to new issues of common stock and con­
vertible debt to explain asymmetry of information between 
managers and investors. The authors find a positive price 
effect in the period before announcement and a two day neg­
ative return at the time of the announcement. This suggests 
that managers do indeed time sales of new securites when the 
market overprices them and investors discount this at an­
nouncement of the new issue. 
For offers that were cancelled, the authors find that the 
price reaction, after the announcement, is opposite that of 
completed offerings. Between announcement and cancellation 
a significant negative return is observed. Whereas for the 
completed offerings, a significant positive return is ob­
served, suggesting that managers tend to cancel offerings 
that they view as underpriced. In cross-sectional tests a 
larger negative price impact on new issues of common stock 
and convertible debt is observed as compared with straight 
debt. 
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Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) 
find that negative returns during announcements of stock of­
ferings for utilities are smaller than those for industri­
als. In these studies, the authors hypothesize that this 
may be due to the larger information asymmetry for industri­
als as compared with the regulated industry. Asquith and 
Mullins also hypothesize that the negative price reaction to 
new issues represents a substantial "cost of false signall­
ing" to firms that finance dividend signals through new is­
sues . 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) also differentiate between of­
ferings that involve a decrease in the percentage sharehold­
ings of the management and those that do not. They find 
that the negative price reaction to an announcement that in­
cludes a decrease in insider holdings is significantly 
stronger than that for offerings that have no change in pel— 
centage of insider holdings. This is consistent with the 
Leland and Pyle (1977) model and the hypothesis in this 
study that higher insider holding reduces information asym­
metry. 
Eckbo (1986) examines the announcement effect of debt of­
ferings. He finds a negative price impact of debt offering 
announcements. The author thus finds evidence for the asym­
metric information models of Miller and Rock (1985) and 
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Myers and Majluf (1984) that predict a negative price reac­
tion to new issues for both debt and equity. Models that 
predict leverage to be a positive signal of firm value (Ross 
(1977) and Heinkel (1982)) are rejected. 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) provide empirical evidence for 
the relationship between agency costs and the leverage deci­
sion of a firm. In their study, firms are split into two 
groups: (1) those with an insider ownership of less than 
five percent (widely held firms) and (2) those with an in­
sider ownership of over 25 percent (closely held firms). 
Kim and Sorensen find that closely held firms have higher 
leverage than widely held firms, which is contrary to the 
hypotheses and results of this study. 
Several potential sources of error that may have distort­
ed the results of the Kim and Sorensen study are presented 
below: 
(1) The division of firms into groups by insider ownership 
and elimination of firms with percentage insider hold­
ings between 5 and 25 percent is arbitrary and introduc­
es a selection bias in the sample. Also the data for 
insider ownership is obtained from Value Line with a 
limited sample of 164 firms (82 firms in each ownership 
group) used for the analysis. The problems with data 
from Value Line are discussed above. 
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(2) For the regression analysis a one-zero dummy variable 
is used as a proxy for the insider ownership. The use 
of the percentage insider ownership, without deleting 
firms in the intermediate group, would eliminate any se­
lection bias and provide a continous variable for the 
analysis. 
(3) The matching of firms into pairs representing closely 
held and widely held firms, within an industry, and de­
leting firms that do not match may have also introduced 
a selection bias. 
(4) Kim and Sorensen do not control for the number of insid­
ers and thus do not distinguish between a firm that has 
a large percentage owned by one insider and a firm with 
many "small" insiders. 
The present study eliminates the above problems and uses a 
comprehensive sample of 1765 firms for the analysis. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
Information asymmetry has a wide range of implications. 
In general, the value of the firm under asymmetric informa­
tion will be less than the value of the firm under perfect 
information. 
As.discussed above, the implications for pricing of new 
issues have been empirically investigated by several re­
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searchers. The Eckbo (1986) study finds evidence for the 
asymmetric information models of Miller and Rock (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1985) but rejects the positive signalling 
models of leverage by Ross (1977) and Heinkel (1982). 
The present study addresses the implications of informa­
tion asymmetry for dividend payout and leverage equilibrium 
of the firm. A more direct empirical approach of cross-sec­
tional tests is used to provide evidence for the positive 
signalling models of both dividends and leverage. 
Chapter III 
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
In agency literature, the corporation is viewed as a com­
plex set of contracts. For this study, the discussion is 
restricted to contracts between managers (agents) and the 
other claimholders of the firm. Assuming that the agents 
and securityholders are utility maximizing individuals with 
different self interests and information sets, there will be 
a conflict of interest, creating an agency problem. Agency 
costs, as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), are in­
curred in the form of: (a) monitoring and bonding expenses 
and (b) the loss by the securityholders due to the own wel­
fare maximization decisions of the managers. 
In order to decrease total agency costs, several mecha­
nisms have been discussed in financial literature. Competi­
tive market mechanisms are discussed in Fama (1980). Fama 
suggests that the "threat of takeovers" and managerial labor 
markets force managers to act in a value maximizing manner. 
Another means of reducing agency costs is through direct 
contractual provisions. Smith and Warner (1979) discuss 
contractual provisions between stockholders and bondholders 
and Smith and Uatts (1984) suggest the use of management 
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compensation contracts between securityholders and managers 
to reduce agency problems. 
The focus of this study is the signalling mechanism of 
reducing agency costs. For this study, the agency cost and 
information asymmetry arguments have been synthesized, since 
one of the principal sources of agency costs is information­
al asymmetry.7 
3.1 THE MODEL 
The purpose of the model and the analysis is to derive te­
stable implications for dividend policy, leverage, and in­
sider ownership. Consider a firm which makes decisions in a 
one period planning horizon. The beginning of the period is 
is time 0 and the end is time 1. At time 0, an information 
asymmetry exists. The insidei—managers have superior infor— 
mation regarding firm value at time 1 as compared with the 
outside investors. Dividends, leverage, and insider ownei— 
ship are costly signals of firm value and at time 0 insidei— 
managers make signalling decisions regarding firm value at 
7 It should be noted that the study is not a complete chai— 
acterization of agency cost equilibria. Other sources of 
agency costs not considered in this study are: (1) the 
propensity of the agents to consume excessive perks (see 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)); (2) the incentive for the 
firm to undertake high risk projects that transfer wealth 
from the bondholders to the stockholders (see Barnea et 
al. (1985)); and (3) the incentive for managers to forego 
positive net present value projects (see Myers (1977)). 




The outside shareholders form some estimate of the value 
of the firm based on the dividend, leverage, and ownership 
signals of the insiders. The market price of stock at the 
end of the period (time 1), is based upon an estimate of fu­
ture investment opportunities of the firm V(D,B,a) and the 
realization of uncertain cash flows, X, at the end of the 
period. 
The probability density function of the cash flows, f(X), 
is identical across firms and X is a location parameter for 
the cash flow distributions of each firm within the economy 
such that: 
f(X> = 0 for X < X 
and > 0 for X ^ X 
The insider's objective function can then be written as: 
1 00 
Max E(D,B,oc) = [ V(D,B,a) + J Xf(X)dX -
D.B.a 1+R X 
D+B B 
J /3(D+B-X)f(X)dX - J 7(B—X)f(X)dX 
B X 
- &(a,A) ] ( 1 ) 
Subject to B £ 0, D ^ 0, and 0 £ a £ 1. 
24 
where 
E is the time 0 firm value, 
D is the dividend paid at time 1, 
B is the face value of debt due at time 1, 
a is the proportion of equity held by the insiders, 
R is the risk free rate of return, 
V is the value of the investment opportunities 
of the firm at time 1, 
X is the cash flow of the firm at time 1, 
f (X) is the density function of the cash flows at 
time 1, 
& is the cost function of raising additional funds 
to finance the firm's projects, 
y is the cost function of raising additional funds 
to meet the debt payments, 
& is the cost function imposed on the insiders due 
to loss of diversification, and 
A is a measure of the non-systematic risk of the 
firm. 
The objective function consists of five different terms. 
V(D,B,a) represents the outsider's estimate of the firm's 
growth opportunities. This estimate is based on the signal 
by insiders at time 0. The next term represents the sum, 
over all states of the world, of the firm's cash flows X. 
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The third term in the expression is similar to the one 
developed in Bhattacharya (1979) and Eades (1982). Here, B 
represents the cost function imposed on the firm for raising 
additional funds (due to dividend signalling) in order to 
finance the firm's projects at the end of the planning hori­
zon. This cost becomes large, especially when the firm's 
cash flows are smaller than the dividends and debt paid out 
at the end of the period. The upper limit of integration 
reflects the additional funds necessary to pay both divi­
dends and debt payments. It should be noted that it is op­
timal for the firm to pay off debt before any dividends are 
paid. 
The fourth term in the objective function represents the 
costs of leverage signalling. These costs are incurred in 
the form of increased bankruptcy costs. Again, the cost be­
comes large when the firm's cash flows are less than the 
face value of debt maturing at the end of the period. These 
costs may be incurred in the form of distress sales of as­
sets to meet the debt payments. Here, 7 is the cost func­
tion that describes the costs associated with raising funds 
to meet the debt payments. Since it is optimal for the firm 
to pay off their debt before they pay out any dividends, the 
limits of integration on the cost of debt term are from X to 
B. 
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The final term represents the loss of personal diversifi­
cation by insiders because they retain a portion of the 
firm's equity for signalling purposes. Here S represents 
the cost function for the loss of diversification suffered 
by the insiders. These costs may be incurred by the insid­
er's, to diversify their portfolios or by the firm to raise 
additional funds to diversify. It is assumed that these 
costs are not state dependent and are a function of the pel— 
centage insider holdings and the non-systematic risk meas­
ure, A, of the firm. 
The primary difference between the objective function de­
veloped above and the work of Bhattacharya (1979) and Eades 
(1982) is that a multi-dimensional model is considered here 
with insider ownership, dividends, and leverage as signals 
of firm value. The previous studies consider a one dimen­
sional model with dividends as signals. 
For the optimal solution of the function (1) the follow­























where TC is the total cost,of signalling. 
The explicit first and second derivatives of the total 
cost with respect to each of the signals are derived in Ap­
pendix D. The marginal cost of the signals is positive and 
under the assumptions outlined in Appendix D satisfy the 
Spence condition that: 
dTC dTC dS 
, , >0 (3) 
dB dD doc 
It can be shown that a change in the marginal cost of 
each signal, holding other costs constant will yield: 
da dzS d2S 
_ / < 0 (4) 
dA da2  dadA 
dB d2S d2TC 
= / > o (5) 
dA dadA dBz  
and 
dD d2S d2TC 
=  /  >  o  ( 6 )  
dA dadA dD2  
Equations 4, 5, and 6 are explicitly derived in Appendix 
D. Thus a and B will move in opposite directions in re­
sponse to a change in the marginal cost of signalling via 
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insider holdings. Also, a and D will move in opposite di­
rections in response to a similar change. 
Since some firms within the economy have more non-system-
atic risk than others, insiders find it more costly to own a 
significant portion of such firms due to higher loss of pei— 
sonal diversification. The marginal cost of signalling, via 
insider ownership, for such firms is higher than others and 
thus the equilibrium condition leads to a different optimal 
signalling policy. To compensate for the higher marginal 
cost of signalling with insider ownership, firms will signal 
through either dividends or leverage. Thus for data in 
which cross-sectional variations in the relative cost or 
benefit of the signals is important a negative relationship 
should be observed. Formally, the relationship between a 
and B and a and D may be written as: 
dB dD 
and <0 (7) 
da da 
This suggests the following hypotheses for leverage and div­
idend signalling: 
HI: Widely held firms will have higher leverage 
than closely held firms, ceteris paribus. 
H2: Widely held firms will have higher payouts 
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than closely held firms, ceteris paribus. 
The leverage hypothesis (HI) as stated above is a joint 
test of signalling and risk aversion hypotheses. McLean 
(1984) argues that ownei—managers, apart from holding equity 
in the firm, have an additional stake, human capital, in­
vested in the firm. Thus managers, being risk averse indi­
viduals, will have an incentive to decrease the probability 
of default and utilize less debt in the firm's financial 
structure. An empirical test, later in the study, provides 
evidence for the signalling hypothesis and rejects the risk 
aversion hypothesis. 
The dividend clientele effect may be argued as signifi­
cantly contributing to the dividend signalling hypothesis 
(H2). If it is assumed that the owner managers are high tax 
bracket individuals, they may indeed have little incentive 
to pay dividends, since dividends are taxed at a higher rate 
than capital gains. However, in a Miller and Scholes world, 
this is not apparent. This issue has not been addressed in 
the present study and may be an interesting issue for future 
research. 
Chapter IV 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The insider ownership and financial data used in this 
study are primarily obtained from the Disclosure public com­
pany information data base. Insider ownership data of NYSE, 
AMEX, and OTC firms are included for the fiscal year 1981 
and 1984.9 Other sources of data used in this study include 
the Compustat Annual Industrial tapes for finanacial infoi— 
mation and the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) tapes for monthly stock prices. 
4.1 THE DISCLOSURE DATA BASE 
Use of the Disclosure data base for financial research is 
relatively new. The only other study to use insider ownei— 
ship data from the Disclosure tapes is by Lloyd, Jahera, and 
Goldstein (1986). Ownership and comprehensive financial 
data for over 4500 firms are available from these tapes. 
9 Any bias introduced due to the fiscal year data for finan­
cial information and year end data for ownership is inves­
tigated by eliminating firms that do not have December as 
their fiscal year end. The results do improve when only 
firms with December year end are included in the analysis, 
however the difference was not very significant. The 
larger sample is used for the study as it provides a big 
enough sample size for the industry analysis. 
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The ownership summary provides the number of shareholders 
and the percentage of outstanding stock owned by four major 
classes: (a) investment firms, (b) institutions, (c) 5 pei— 
cent owners, and (d) insiders. A sample ownership record 
for A. G. Edwards Inc. is presented in Table 4.1 . The 
source of these data is the filings by institutions and in­
dividuals with the SEC. 
Since Disclosure is a relativley new source of informa­
tion for research, some of the existing and potential prob­
lems with the use of the data are discussed below: 
(1) Unlike Compustat and the CRSP data bases, the Disclo­
sure tapes are not formatted to facilitate easy use. 
Missing data are not coded and are excluded from the 
data listed. Thus each company record has a variable 
length which makes the data difficult to access without 
substantial reformatting. 
(2) The Disclosure tapes include about 9500 firms. How­
ever, data frequently are missing and ownership records 
for only about 4500 firms are available. A majority of 
the firms also have missing sources and uses of funds 
statements. 
(3) Since error rates have not been compiled for the Dis­
closure tapes, a comparison of results using this infoi— 
mation is necessary with results from other sources such 
as the Compustat tapes. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Sample Ownership Record from Disclosure 
A. G. Edwards Inc. 

















where Q denotes data that are revised quarterly, 
M denotes data that are revised monthly, 
Change denotes the change in number of shares held in 
thousands, and 
Held denotes the number of shares held in thousands 
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As discussed above, a comprehensive error rate investiga­
tion and substantial reformatting are required before the 
tapes can be widely used for financial research. 
4.2 THE SAMPLE 
An initial analysis is performed on the aggregate sample 
of 1765 firms. Selection of the sample for analysis is 
based on the following criteria: 
(1) Complete data on financial statements and insider owner— 
ship must be available on the Disclosure tapes; 
(2) Industry groups with less than 30 firms have been ex­
cluded from the industry analysis. The aggregate analy­
sis, however, includes all firms with complete data; 
(3) Firms with insider ownership of 99.99 percent were de­
leted from the sample due to the possibility of double 
counting from filings with the SEC10 
(4) For the dividend analysis, firms with negative earnings 
during the year have been deleted from the sample. How­
ever, firms not paying dividends are included, as this 
may represent the firm's dividend policy decision. 
10 This is based on discussions with a representative of 
Computer Directions Advisors, Inc., the firm that col­
lects the data from SEC filings. 
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Financial data for firms are cross checked for accuracy 
with data from the Compustat annual industrial tapes by com­
paring regression results with data from both sources. The 
ownership data for a sample of firms is also compared with 
the data from the Value Line Investment Survey (see Appendix 
A). 
In order to control for the influence of exogenous vari­
ables, such as the investment opportunity set of the firm, 
further analysis is done on an industry basis. The industry 
groups are identified by the primary SIC code of the firms. 
However, the classification is done on the basis of homoge­
neity within the industry rather than two, three, or four 
digit SIC codes.11 For a complete discussion of the use of 
SIC codes as a means of classifying industry groups see Bow-
en, Daley, and Huber (1982). The sample classification for 
this paper and the number of firms within each industry are 
presented in Table 4.2 . A total of ten industries, each 
with over 30 firms having complete financial data, are iden­
tified. The sample size for the dividend analysis is less 
than the number in Table 4.2 because firms with negative 
11 Other means of classification into homogenous groups with 
similar investment opportunity sets are considered. One 
proxy used for the investment opportunity set is the 
growth in net fixed assets. The variable is used as a 
continous variable and in the dummy form in cross-sec­
tional regressions for leverage and payout. In these re­
gressions the variable is insignificant in explaining 
cross-sectional variations in debt and payout ratios. 
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earnings are excluded for this analysis. A majority of the 
industries (eight) are non-regulated. Two regulated indus­
tries, national banks and electric services, are included in 
the analysis for comparison of the results with the non-reg­
ulated group. 
For the initial analysis, firms within each industry 
group are split into three categories based on the degree of 
insider ownership. The three groups chosen for analysis 
are: (1) insider ownership of below 10 percent (group 1), 
(2) insider ownership between 10 and 45 percent (group 2), 
and (3) insider ownership of over 45 percent (group 3). The 
primary issue involved here is one of control of the firm.1 2 
Group 1 with an insider ownership of less than 10 percent is 
classified as the widely held group. Group 2 is the intej— 
mediate group, which in some cases may be argued to contain 
closely held firms and in other cases widely held firms, de­
pending upon the type of firm and its ownership. Group 3 is 
hypothesized to consist of closely held firms. 
12 The division of firms into groups by percentage insider 
ownership is based on the degree of control exercised by 
the insiders on the firm's decisions. Another classifica­
tion used is the same as Kim and Sorensen (1986): group 1 
(less than five percent insider ownership, group 2 (be­
tween 5 and 25 percent insider ownership), and group 3 
(above 25 percent insider ownership). The results for 
both these classifications were virtually the same. How­
ever, the former classification was used as it yields a 
better distribution of firms among groups. Unequal group 




Industry Groups in Sample 
No of Firms 
Aggregate Data 1765 
Mining SIC Nos. 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 1310,11 125 
Manufacturing SIC Nos. 
Printing & Publishing 2710 - 2795 56 
Electronic Computing Equipment 3573 92 
Radio and T. V. Communication 
Equipment 3662 67 
Measuring and Controlling 
Instruments 3820,22,23,24,25,29 50 
Surgical and Medical 
Supplies 3840,41,42,43 34 
Transportation & Public Utilities SIC Nos 
Electric Services 4911,31 79 
Retail Trade SIC Nos. 
Eating & Drinking Places 5810,12,13 39 
Finance SIC Nos 
National Banks, Fed Members 6025 108 
Services SIC Nos. 
Computer Data Processing 7370,72,74,79 66 
716 
The number of firms in this table are obtained after 
eliminating firms with incomplete financial information. 
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Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to test whether sig­
nificant differences exist in the leverage and payout ratios 
among the 3 groups. Since both the payout and leverage rat­
ios are non-normal (see Appendix B and C for normality test 
results), the non parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is used. 
The non-normality for payout ratios is probably due to the 
deletion of observations with negative values and a large 
proportion (33 percent) of firms not paying dividends. 
Transformations of the ratios did not eliminate the problem. 
Another underlying assumption of ANOVA is that all firms 
in the sample are independent of each other. Since firms 
are split into groups within industries, it may be argued 
that the independence assumption is violated within groups. 
However, past studies on payout and leverage have shown that 
a significant portion of the variability in these ratios is 
due to non-industry factors. Boquist and Moore (1984) argue 
that leverage preferences vary across managers, even if they 
are from the same industry. 
The overall F test from ANOVA detects at least one con­
trast that is different from zero, therefore, a pairwise 
comparison of means is necessary to complete the analysis. 
The Tukey-Kramer test is used for the pairwise comparison of 
means as it is considered the best overall approach (see 
Stoline (1981)). 
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Finally, cross-sectional regression analysis is performed 
using two different approaches. The first set of regres­
sions are performed on the aggregate sample and each indus­
try separately. In the next set, the regressions are per— 
formed on the aggregate sample using dummy variables for 
industry classification. The models used for the regres­
sions and a discussion of the explanatory variables follow. 
4.3 THE LEVERAGE MODEL 
The functional form of the leverage equation is assumed 
to be linear, as in previous studies by Bradley, Jarrell, 
and Kim (1984) and Long and Malitz (1983): 
S = 3o  + |8i %Insid + j32 Nolnsid + Stddev + RAD + <3 
jS5 Sales + j36 Depr + e 
where 
& is the leverage ratio of the firm,13 
/30 is the intercept term. 
13 The leverage ratio is defined as: 
long term debt 
long term debt+ Market value of equity 
This ratio eliminates the problem of inclusion of leases 
and convertible debt which may be used to reduce the 
agency problem. For a discussion of how convertible debt 
may be used to eliminate the agency problem see Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Also, leases have been shown to be 
substitutes for debt (see Ang and Peterson (1984)), and 
may as such distort the results. 
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%Insid is the percentage of insider holdings, 
Nolnsid is the natural log of the number of insiders, 
Stddev is the standard deviation of the first 
difference in earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) over five years, 
RAD is the ratio of research and development 
expenditures to total assets, 
Sales is the natural log of the firm's sales 
revenue, 
Depr is the ratio of depreciation to total 
assets, 
0 i ,  0 z ,  0 3 ,  0 * ,  0 s ,  and 0 t ,  are the coefficients of the 
corresponding explanatory variables, and 
e is the error term. 
Summary statistics of the variables used for the regression 
are presented in Table 4.3 . 
TABLE 4.3 
Summary Statistics for Leverage Data 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Ltdebt 1771 0.1944 0.1962 0 0.9985 
%Insid 1771 23.7166 23.8802 0 95.9700 
Nolnsid 1771 2.2565 0.9445 0 4.6151 
Stddev 1765 85.8218 134.6567 0.6070 958.3270 
RAD 1771 0.0112 0.0311 0 0.2628 
Depr 1771 0.0136 0.0264 0 0.1898 
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4.4 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES - LEVERAGE 
4.4.1 Insider Ownership 
The insider ownership variable is defined as the percent­
age of outstanding equity held by insiders.14 It is hypoth­
esized that insider ownership is negatively related to the 
firm's leverage. The variable is available from the owner— 
ship summary on the Disclosure tapes. 
4.4.2 Number of Insiders 
The number of insiders is the other variable used to 
measure the concentration of control of the firm. The larg­
er the number of insiders, the less closely held the firm. 
This variable has not been used in earlier studies, since it 
has only been available through SEC filings. Prior studies 
have used Value Line data which only reports percent insider 
ownership. 
The number of insiders provides another dimension for the 
measurement of the degree of control of a firm.1® The hy-
14 An insider is defined by the SEC as any officer, direc­
tor, or a 10 percent principal stockholder. Insiders are 
required to file form 3 with the SEC within 10 days of 
establishing an initial position in any of the firm's 
registered securities. Whenever there is a change in the 
number of shares held (purchase, sale, exercise of op­
tion, gift, or stock split) the insider must file form 4 
within 10 days after the month end following the event 
date. 
15 The issue of large blocks of stocks controlled by insid­
ers that do not get along with each other as compared 
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pothesized sign on this variable is positive. The data are 
available directly from the ownership summary on the Disclo­
sure tapes. 
4.4.3 Standard Deviation of EBIT 
Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) show that the variabili­
ty in a firm's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) is 
an important determinant of leverage. The greater the vari­
ability in EBIT, the higher the probability of default and 
the lower the leverage. Also higher EBIT variability im­
plies higher operating leverage if the variability in sales 
is held constant. Traditional finance assumes that operat­
ing and financial leverage should be negatively related as 
firms with high business risk have a lower capacity for fi­
nancial risk. However, Myers (1977) suggests a positive re­
lationship between leverage and business risk. He argues 
that a firm with high business risk will borrow more, as 
risky debt does not negatively influence the firm's market 
value to the same extent that it influences a low business 
risk firm. The variable (stddev) is estimated by calculat­
ing the standard deviation of the first difference in EBIT 
over the past five years. The hypothesized relationship be­
tween leverage and variability in EBIT is positive. 
with several "small" insiders voting together is not ad­
dressed in the study. 
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4.4.4 Research and Development Expense 
Long and Malitz (1983) hypothesize that the firm's intan­
gible investment opportunities reduce its debt capacity. 
Their argument is that bondholders cannot effectively moni­
tor the intangible investments of the firm such as invest­
ments in R&D. Firms also usually will not divulge their R&D 
plans as this may provide important information to competi­
tors. Since the bondholders are not able to monitor these 
investments, there is an incentive on the part of the cui— 
rent owner—managers to undertake risky projects resulting in 
a wealth transfer from the bondholders to the stockholders. 
This follows from the argument that equity may be modelled 
as a call option on the firm. The stockholders may, at the 
maturity of the debt, buy back the firm from the bondholders 
or default. It is also well known that the value of a call 
option is an increasing function of risk. Thus there is an 
incentive on the part of stockholders to undertake risky 
projects. 
Bondholders realize this and in a rational expectations 
model demand higher interest on the debt of firms with large 
intangible investments, thereby reducing the firm's debt ca­
pacity. Thus the hypothesized sign for the R&D variable is 
negative. The variable is estimated as a ratio of R&D ex­
penses to total assets. 
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4.4.5 Sales Revenue 
Sales revenue is used as a proxy for firm size and is in­
cluded in the set of regressors to control for any "size ef­
fect". Studies by Ferri and Jones (1979) and Flath and 
Knoeber (1980) argue that larger firms have more debt capac­
ity and are able to issue debt at a lower cost when compared 
to smaller firms. Since larger firms are typically more 
closely followed by analysts and investors, size is an im­
portant consideration as smaller firms should have a greater 
information asymmetry than larger firms. Arbel (1985) finds 
that firms that are not closely followed by analysts outpei— 
form firms that are closely followed. He attributes this 
"neglected firm effect" to the difference in information as­
ymmetry between firms. However, one would expect a negative 
correlation between firm size and insider ownership; the 
smaller the firm, the more closely held it is likely to be. 
4.4.6 Depreciation 
This variable provides an estimate of the firm's tangible 
asset base. It eliminates assets that may be non-producing 
or obsolete, essentially eliminating assets that have al­
ready been depreciated. Since a majority of the firms use 
straight line depreciation for financial reporting purposes, 
variations due to different depreciation practices for tax 
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purposes are eliminated. Myers C1977) and subsequently Long 
and Malitz (1983) argue that firms with a larger asset base 
will have a greater capacity to support debt, since fixed 
assets are relatively easy to monitor and provide collateral 
for bondholders. The hypothesized sign on the depreciaton 
variable is positive. A similar variable is used in Brad­
ley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984). The variable is standardized 
by taking a ratio of depreciation expense to total assets. 
A summary of the explanatory variables and the hypoth­
esized relationship between the explanatory variables and 
the leverage ratio is presented in Table 4.4 . 
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TABLE 4.4 
Hypothesized Signs of the Explanatory Variables: 
Dependent Variable - Leverage Ratio 
Explanatory Variable Hypothesized Sign Variable Name 
Percentage of insider 
ownership 
Natural logarithm of the 
number of insiders 
Standard deviation of the 
first difference in 
earnings before interest 
and taxes over the past 
five years 
Ratio of research & 
development expenses to 
total assets 
Natural logarithm of sales 
revenue 
Ratio of depreciation 








4.5 THE DIVIDEND MODEL 
The dividend payout model is similar to the model devel­
oped by Rozeff (1982). The regression model to be estimated 
is of the form: 
P = fio + 8i %Insid + 02 Noinsid + 03 DOL + $4 DFL + 
/3s Sgroth + 06 Sales + e 
where 








is the intercept term, 
is the percentage of insider holdings, 
is the natural log of the number of insid­
ers, 
is the degree of operating leverage of the 
firm, 
is the degree of financial leverage of the 
firm, 
is the geometric mean of the percentage 
sales growth over the past five years, 
is the natural log of the firm's sales 
revenue, 
16 The payout ratio is defined as the ratio of dividends per 
share to earnings per share. Preferred stock dividends 
are excluded. 
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3i, j3z, /33, j3/>. 05. and /36 are the coefficients of the 
corresponding independent variables, and 
e is the error term. 
Results of this study, however, will be stronger than the 
Rozeff study since: 
( 1 )  A n  a d d i t i o n a l  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e  h a s  b e e n  i n t r o d u c e d  
to control for size. 
(2) The investment opportunity set has been controlled by 
conducting the analysis on an industry basis. 
(3) Any distortion introduced by averaging the data over 
several years has been eliminated. 
(4) An additional variable, number of insiders, has been 
added to distinguish between firms that have a large per— 
centage owned by one individual as compared to the percent­
age owned by several individuals. 
(5) Disclosure data is used, which eliminates any approxi­
mate ownership data and provides a larger sample size for 
analysis. 
Summary statistics of the data used in the regression are 
presented in Table 4.5. 
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TABLE 4.5 
Summary Statistics for Payout Data 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Payout 1771 0.2598 0.2515 0 0.9893 
%Insid 1771 23.7166 23.8802 0 95.9700 
Nolnsid 1771 2.2565 0.9445 0 4.6151 
Sales 1771 19.0663 1.9365 6.4599 26.7544 
DOL 1770 7.3416 15.5195 0.0930 166.1400 
DFL 1771 1.4530 1.5821 -15.1221 27.8500 
Sgroth 1725 22.8829 33.3290 -24.5999 237.1999 
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4.6 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES - PAYOUT 
The agency variables used in this model are the same as 
in the leverage model. Again, the hypothesized relationship 
between payout and insider ownership is negative. On the 
other hand, the hypothesized relationship between the number 
of insiders and the payout ratio is positive. The firm's 
sales revenue is included to control for the firm "size ef­
fect" . 
4.6.1 Degree of Operating Leverage 
The degree of operating leverage is hypothesized to have 
a negative relationship with payout ratio. Rozeff (1982) 
argues that the higher a firm's operating leverage, the more 
the firm will reduce payout to lower the cost of financing, 
other things being equal. The DOL is estimated using: 
% A EBIT 
DOL = 2 | | / N 
% A Sales 
The absolute value of the past five years data is used since 
it is the magnitude of the volatility that is important and 
not the direction (see Reilly (1985)). The hypothesized 
sign for this variable is negative. 
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4.6.2 Degree of Financial Leverage 
The degree of financial leverage is also hypothesized to 
have a negative relationship with the payout ratio. As with 
operating leverage, the higher a firm's financial leverage, 
the more the firm will reduce payout to lower its cost of 




EBIT - I 
where: 
EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes, and 
I is the interest expense. 
4.6.3 Sales Growth 
The firm's sales growth provides an estimate of its 
growth opportunities. The geometric mean of the past five 
years' sales growth is used as a proxy for the sales growth. 
Typically, firms that have larger growth opportunities have 
a greater need for internal funds and thus pay out a smaller 
proportion of their earnings. 
A summary of the explanatory variables and the hypoth­
esized relationships between the explanatory variables and 
payout are presented in Table 4.6 . 
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TABLE 4.6 
Hypothesized Signs of the Explanatory Variables: 
Dependent Variable - Payout Ratio 
Explanatory Variable Hypothesized Sign Variable Name 
Percentage of insider 
ownership 
Natural logarithm of the 
number of insiders 
Degree of operating 
leverage 
Degree of financial 
leverage 
Natural logarithm of sales 
revenue 
Geometric mean of the 









5.1 INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND DIVIDENDS 
5.1.1 Group Analysis 
Tests for the normality of the payout ratios are done be­
fore the analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure is pet— 
formed. The skewness, kurtosis, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
D statistic indicate non-normality for the aggregate data as 
well as for the individual groups. The results of the tests 
are reported in Table IB in Appendix B. The skewness and 
kurtosis for the the closely held group (group3) is the 
largest of the three groups. This is due to the fact that a 
large proportion of the closely held firms (52 percent) do 
not pay dividends, as compared with 22 percent for the wide-
ly held firms Cgroupl). 
The payout ratios are transformed using several different 
approaches. The results of the natural logarithm and the 
square root transformations are reported in Table IB. Since 
the transformations did not significantly improve the nor— 




The results of the group analysis for payout ratio are 
presented in Table 5.1 . Both the ANOVA and the non-para­
metric Kruskal- Wallis test results show significance at the 
5 percent level for the aggregate data as well as four of 
the eight industries. Thus non-normality, in this case, 
does not alter the results substantially. 
The Tukey-Kramer test results reported are for the pairwise 
comparison of means. Each pair of groups is presented in 
the table, with significant differences in pairs marked by 
an asterisk. As expected, these results also detect a dif­
ference in means in the same industries as the ANOVA and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests. Industries in which payout ratios are 
not significant have a large disparity in the number of ob­
servations across groups, resulting in a decrease in the 
power of the overall test. By casual observation, all in­
dustries except Computer Data Processing, had lower payouts 
for the closely held group (group 3) as compared with the 
widely held group (group 1). 
TABLE 5.1 
Results of the Group Analysis - Payout Ratio 
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Industry Group N Group Overall ChiSq Tukey-
Mean F ANOVA Kruskal Kramer 
Payout Uallis Test 
Aggregate Data 1 719 0.3499 101.19 183.20 1-2* 
2 706 0.2262 <.001) (.001) 1-3* 
3 346 0.1411 2-3* 
Crude Petroleum 
& Natural Gas 1 21 0.3632 3.69 6.67 1-2* 
2 22 0.1593 (.031) (.036) 1-3* 
3 21 0.1589 2-3 
Printing and 
Publishing 1 13 0.2405 6.01 8.78 1-2 
2 20 0.3349 (.005) (.012) 1-3 
3 15 0.1627 2-3* 
Electronic 
Computing Equip. 1 12 0.1497 8.10 10.98 1-2* 
2 29 0.0103 (.001) (.004) 1-3* 
3 17 0.0147 2-3 
Radio & TV 
Equipment 1 15 0.2658 4.98 8.87 1-2* 
2 17 0.1031 (.011) (.012) 1-3* 
3 16 0.0553 2-3 
Measuring & 
Control Instr. 1 4 0.1459 .02 0.24 1-2 
2 18 0.1299 (.956) (.889) 1-3 
3 9 0.1195 2-3 
Eating & Drinking 
Places 1 1 0.0000 1 .31 2.78 1-2 
2 20 0.1339 (.185) (.249) 1-3 
3 12 0.0737 2-3 
National Banks 1 57 0.3613 0.69 0.86 1-2 
2 29 0.3437 (.311) (.649) 1-3 
3 9 0.3011 2-3 
Computer Data 
Processing 1 7 0.0340 1 .62 2.25 1-2 
2 26 0.0360 (.265) (.279) 1-3 
3 17 0.1100 2-3 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
Group 1: below 10 percent insider ownership 
Group 2: between 10 and 45 percent insider ownership 
Group 3: above 45 percent insider ownership 
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5.1.2 Regression Analysis 
In order to detect if the dependent variable is related 
to the independent variables, a correlation analysis is pei— 
formed. This analysis also helps detect potential multi-
col linearity problems among the dependent variables. Table 
5.2 shows the correlation matrix for the dividend payout 
variables. Several of the explanatory variables exhibit 
significant multicollinearity, as expected because of the 
increased sensitivity of the correlation analysis as the 
sample size increases. However, sales are highly correlated 
with %Insid, Nolnsid, and Sgroth. Multi-collinearity does 
not, in general, influence the ability to obtain a good fit; 
it may however alter either the sign or the significance of 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables. One remedy 
is to run the regressions without the correlated variable, 
reducing the standard errors of the estimated regression 
coefficients of the independent variables. Thus sales is 
omitted for the initial set of regressions. Further analy­
sis done with sales included as an explanatory variable 
shows that multicollinearity does not significantly alter 
the regressions. 
All the signs in the correlation matrix are as predicted 
although DFL is not significant. As expected the number of 
insiders is positively correlated with the percentage of in-
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TABLE 5.2 
Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variable- Payout Ratio 
(P Values in Parentheses) 
1725 Firms 
Payout %Insid Nolnsid Sale DOL DFL Sgroth 
Payout 1.0000 -0.3057 0.3184 









( . 0 0 0 )  
0.5216 -.1407 
(.0001) ( .0001) 
-0.2814 .0618 
(.0001) ( .0093) 
0.5141 — .0886 
(.0001) ( .0002) 
1.0000 — . 1202 











( .0000)  
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sider ownership variable. The DFL and DOL variables are po­
sitively correlated, providing evidence for the Myers (1977) 
hypothesis that the value of a firm with high business risk 
is affected to a lesser degree by risky debt as compared 
with a firm that has small business risk. Thus firms with 
high business risk may use more risky debt in their capital 
structures. 
The results of the least squares regression using payout 
as the dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3 . The 
residuals from the regression are tested for independence 
and non-normality. Results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
are presented in Table 1B in Appendix B. Also an approxi­
mate test for normality by Snedecor and Cochran (1980) is 
used. The test statistics are: 
<*3 «4 
>/ 6 / N «>/ 24 / N 
where: 
a3 is the skewness of the distribution, 
a*, is the kurtosis of the distribution, and 
N is the number of observations. 
These statistics have a standard normal distribution. 
The results of the tests indicate non-normality of residu­
als. Several transformations of the dependent variables are 
used to obtain normality. The results for the natural loga­
rithm and square root transformations are in Table IB. 
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While the natural logarithm transformation improves kurtosis 
it increases the skewness. The square root transformation 
gives the best results with lower skewness and kurtosis. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic with the transformation 
improves from 0.08 to 0.03. 
To test for independence of the residuals the Durbin-Wat-
son test for first degree auto-correlation is used. The 
Durbin-Watson D is 1.88 with a first degree auto-correlation 
of 0.06, implying independent error terms. The plots of 
residuals versus the independent variables and predicted 
values are presented in Figures IB to 7B in Appendix B. The 
plots appear to imply homoscedasticity. 
The transformation of the dependent variable resulted in 
an increase in the R square value from 0.30 to 0.37. The 
significance of both the JSInsid and the Nolnsid variables 
also improved. 
The regression for the the aggregate data substantiates 
the evidence in the correlation analysis. Even though sig­
nificant multicollinearity does exist between sales and the 
other variables, the results are as hypothesized. The signs 
on all the variables are as predicted, although the DFL 
coefficient is not significaint. 
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The R square and F values for the aggregate analysis are 
0.37 and 167.19 respectively. These values compare favora­
bly with the Rozeff (1982) results with an R square of 0.48 
and an F value of 185.47. Both the insider variables are 
significant at the .001 level and the signs are as predict­
ed. This provides further evidence for the hypothesis of 
this study that payout and insider ownership are negatively 
related. 
In each of the industry groups except computer data pro­
cessing and electric services, the percentage of equity held 
by insiders is negatively related to the payout ratio, 
though not significantly in all cases. The number of insid­
ers is positively related to the payout in all nine indus­
tries. 
In the electric services (utility) industry the results 
are contrary to those for a majority of the other indus­
tries. This is consistent with the asymmetric information 
hypothesis. Smith (1986), hypothesizes that the regulation 
process in the utility industry reduces the information as­
ymmetry between managers and outside securityholders. Also 
by paying high dividends, utilities frequently have to raise 
external funds through capital markets. This process allows 
an effective monitoring by capital markets and the outsid­
ers. In such a case the relationship between insider owner— 
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ship and dividends under asymmetric information will no 
longer exist since the difference in information is small. 
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TABLE 5.3 
Results of the Least Squares Regression: 
Dependent Variable Payout Ratio - 1984 
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis) 
(-) ( + ) <-) (-) (-) (+) 
Industry N Constant SInsid Nolnsid DOL DFL Sgroth Sales R F 
Square Value 
Aggregate 
Data 1725 -0.631 -.002 .033 -.002 -.002 -0.002 .057 0.37 167.19 
(-8.62) (-8.59) (4.21) (-5.71)(-0.52)(-12.70)(14.18) 
( . 0 0 1 )  ( . 0 0 1 )  ( . 0 0 1 )  ( . 0 0 1 )  ( . 6 0 1 )  ( . 0 0 1 )  ( . 0 0 1 )  ( . 0 0 1 )  
Crude Pet. 








Equipment 51 -0.194 
(-1.23) 
( .226)  
Radio & TV 
Equipment 46 0.416 
( 1 . 8 2 )  
(.076) 
Measuring & 
Cntrl Inst 30 -0.432 
( - 1 . 28 )  
(.214) 
Surgical & 
Medical Sup 21 -0.306 
( -1 .06)  
(.308) 
Electric 
Services 90 1.503 
(6.23) 
( . 001 )  
Eating & Drinking 




Banks 95 0.307 
(3.76) 
( . 001 )  
Comp. Data 







































































































( .001)  
0.26 3.24 
( .020)  
0.31 11.95 




5.2 INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND LEVERAGE 
5.2.1 Group Analysis 
Tests for the normality assumptions are performed before 
the ANOVA group analysis. The skewness, kurtosis, and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D test statistic are reported in Table 1C 
in Appendix C. The test results indicate non-normality. 
Different transformations are attempted to obtain normality. 
The square root transformation does improve the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov D statistic but fails to eliminate the problem. 
Thus the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is preferable 
for these data. 
The results of the group analysis for leverage are pre­
sented in Table 5.4 . For the aggregate data both the ANOVA 
and the Kruskal-Wallis tests detect a difference in group 
means. The Tukey-Kramer test results show a significant 
difference in the means of leverage ratios between the wide­
ly held group (group 1) and the closely held group (group 
3). This provides evidence for the hypothesis of this study 
that there exists a negative relationship between leverage 
and insider ownership. The electrical services industry is 
excluded from this analysis as it does not have any firms in 
the closely held group (group1). 
TABLE 5.4 




















roup N Group Overall ChiSq Tukey-
Mean F AN0VA Kruakal Kramer 
Leverage Hallis Test 
1 719 0. ,2204 13.38 28.53 1-2" 
2 706 0. , 1667 (.001) (.001) 1-3 
3 346 0. , 1966 2-3" 
1 37 0. 2684 2.33 5.48 1-2 
2 43 0. 4282 (.101) (.065) 1-3 
3 45 0. 2940 2-3 
1 16 0. 2025 4.63 7.03 1—2" 
2 26 0. 0815 (.014) (.030) 1-3 
3 14 0. 1903 2-3 
1 27 0. ,2105 6. 16 1 1.34 1-2" 
2 46 0. 0582 (.003) (.013) 1-3" 
3 19 0. 0880 2-3 
1 20 0. , 1245 0.25 0.46 1-2 
2 28 0. , 1059 (.776) (.796) 1-3 
3 19 0. 0795 2-3 
1 8 0. ,0636 0. 16 1.20 1-2 
2 25 0. . 1002 (.851) (.904) 1-3 
3 17 0. 1052 2-3 
1 6 0. . 1570 0.09 0.49 1-2 
2 21 0. . 1652 (.918) (.781) 1-3 
3 7 0. 1310 2-3 
1 3 0. 0543 1 .63 3.04 1-2 
2 25 0. 2164 (.209) (.218) 1-3 
3 11 0, .2421 2-3 
1 60 0. 1984 4.45 8.57 1-2" 
2 37 0, . 1 105 (.014) (.014) 1-3 
3 1 1 0. ,2386 2-3» 
1 14 0. 0952 1 .28 3.78 1-2 
2 32 0, , 1512 (.285) (.151) 1-3 
3 20 0. ,0782 2-3 
• significant at the 10 percent level 
Group 1: below 10 percent insider ownership 
Group 2: between 10 and 45 percent insider ownership 
Group 3: above 45 percent insider ownership 
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In the industry analysis, though six of the ten indus­
tries have a greater leverage for group 1 (widely held 
firms) than group 3 (closely held firms), the difference is 
significant in only one group. Thus, though the aggregate 
results are significant, the results of the industry analy­
sis are not as good as the group analysis for dividends. 
5.2.2 Regression Analysis 
Initially, a correlation analysis is done to detect po­
tential multi-collinearity problems and also to determine if 
a significant relationship exists between the dependent and 
the independent variables. Table 5.5 shows the correlation 
matrix between leverage ratio and the explanatory variables. 
Again sales are highly correlated with the %Insid, Nolnsid, 
and Stddev. Since the multi-collinearity may influence ei­
ther the sign or the interpretation of the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables, sales is not included in the re­
gression. All the signs except Stddev are as predicted and 
each is significant at the .01 level. 
Table 5.6 presents the least squares regression for 
leverage. The residuals from the regression are tested for 
independence and non-normality. Results from the Kolmogo-
rov-Smirnov normality test are given in Table 1C in Appendix 
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TABLE 5.5 
Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variable- Leverage Ratio 
(P Values in Parentheses) 
1765 Firms 
Ltdebt %Insid Nolnsid Sale Stddev RAD Depr 
Ltdebt 1.0000 -0.0677 0.1124 0.2810 -.0027 -.1750 0.2199 
(0.000) (.0043) (.0065) (.0001) (.9099) (.0001) (.0001) 
%Insid 1.0000 0.0462 -0.2895 . 1 161 .0338 -0.0354 
(0.000) (.0519) (.0001) (.0001) (.1551) (.1360) 
Nolnsid 1.0000 0.5141 -.1829 .0516 -0.0146 
(.000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0300) (.5381) 
Sale 1.0000 -.3074 -.1407 0.0741 
(.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0030) 
Stddev 1.0000 .0946-0.0463 
(.000) (.0001) (.0516) 
RAD 1.0000 -0.0608 
(.0000) (.0105) 
Depr 1.0000 
( . 0000 )  
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C. The approximate test by Snedecor and Cochran (1980) de­
scribed in the dividend analysis section is also used to de­
tect non-normality. These test results indicate non-normal­
ity of residuals. Among the several transformations at­
tempted, the square root transformation worked the best, 
reducing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic from 0.10 to 
0.04. 
The Durbin-Watson D for the auto-correlation is 1.96 with 
a first degree auto-correlation of 0.02, implying indepen­
dent error terms. The plots of residuals versus the inde­
pendent variables and predicted values are presented in Fig­
ures 1C to 6C in Appendix C. The plots appear to imply 
constant variance of error terms. 
The transformation of the leverage ratios resulted in an 
increase in the R square value from 0.08 to 0.10. The sig­
nificance of the insider variables also improved. 
TABLE 5.6 
Results of the Least Squares Regression: 
Dependent Variable Leverage Ratio - 1984 
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis) 
(-) ( + ) (+) (-) ( + ) 
Industry N Constant SInsid Nolnsid Stddev RAD Depr R F 
Square Value 
Aggregate 
Data 1765 0.283 -.001 .036 .001 -1.373 1.988 0.10 37.50 
(17.27) (-2.91) (5.911) (2.40) (-7.52) (9.32) 
(.001) (.003) (.001) (.016) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Crude Pet. 
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The results of the aggregate data support the group anal­
ysis results. For the aggregate data, the signs of the 
variables are as predicted and significant at the .01 level. 
This provides further evidence that insider ownership and 
leverage are negatively related. Though the R square of the 
regression is low, the overall F value indicates signifi­
cance. The low R square implies that factors other than the 
financial factors and insider ownership considered in this 
study are also important determinants of the firm's level— 
age. Later in the chapter, the influence of industry ef­
fects is investigated. A low R square value in leverage 
studies is not uncommon. Kim and Sorensen (1986) report an 
R square of 0.15 in their regression analysis. 
In the industry analysis, the percentage of insider own­
ership has a negative coefficient in seven of the ten indus­
tries, though not always significant. Other variables also 
show similar consistency, though not all are significant. 
It is possible that the results for the leverage analysis 
are biased due to the fact that for smaller (closely held) 
firms it is more expensive to raise equity than debt. This 
may be due to a number of reasons, one of which may be: 
lesser access of smaller firms to capital markets than larg­
er firms. Since the study does not account for the differ— 
ence in costs of raising debt and equity, the negative rela­
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tionship between leverage and insider ownership may be 
stronger than indicated by the regression.17 
Overall, the results of the leverage ratio are not as 
significant as the dividend ratio results. One possible 
conclusion is that dividends are used more frequently as 
signals than leverage. This is contrary to what is hypoth­
esized by Sarig (1984). 
5.3 INDUSTRY EFFECTS ON REGRESSIONS 
In order to determine the influence of industry factors 
on the regression analysis, the data for all the firms in 
the ten industry groups are pooled together. A total of 523 
firms are in the sample for the payout analysis and 715 
firms for the leverage analysis. The results of the analy­
ses for leverage and payout ratio are presented in Table 5.7 
A zero-one dummy variable is introduced as an industry 
dummy, thus a total of nine dummy variables are added to the 
regressions. The industry with a mean payout and leverage 
ratio closest to the aggregate mean is the excluded set. 
17 When the sales variable is introduced in the regressions 
the signs of the coefficients are reversed, probably due 
to the multi-collinearity problem. Thus in the leverage 
analysis the results are more sensitive than in the div­
idend analysis. The regression results with the sales 
variable are not reported. 
TABLE 5.7 
Results of Least Squares Regression for Payout 
and Leverage Ratios Uith Industry Duomys 
Payout Leverage 
With Industry Without Ind. Uith Industry Without Ind. 
Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy 
Firms 523 523 715 715 























































































Seven of the nine industry dummy variable coefficients are significant 
at the .01 level for the dividend analysis. 
Eight of the nine industry dummy variable coefficients are significant 
at, "the .01 level for the leverage analysis. 
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For both the payout and leverage ratios a significant in­
crease in the explanatory power of the models is observed. 
The R square for the payout ratio increased by 0.25 and that 
for the leverage ratio increased 0.16. This is consistent 
with the results of other studies such as the Bradley, Jar— 
rell, and Kim (1984) study. This suggests that industry 
factors are significant in explaining the variations in lev­
erage and payouts across firms. However, a significant poi— 
tion of the variability remains unexplained and is probably 
due to the decisions of individual managers at the firm lev­
el. It should be noted that both the percentage of insider 
ownership and number of insiders continue to remain signifi­
cant, with the hypothesized sign. 
5.4 STABILITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP OVER TIME 
Since the data used in the study is cross-sectional in na­
ture and insider ownership data for 1981 are available, the 
cross-sectional regressions were checked for stability over 
time. Because the 1981 Disclosure tape does not report div­
idends and stock prices it is necessary to obtain these 
data from the Compustat tapes by matching firms on both 
tapes. In order to be consistent in the analysis, firms for 
1984 are also matched. The results of the regressions for 
the aggregate data for payout and leverage ratios over both 
years are presented in Tables 5.8 and Table 5.9 . 
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TABLE 5.8 
Results of the Least Squares Regression: 
Dependent Variable Payout Ratio - 1984 
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis) 
(-) (+) (-) <-) (-) <+) 
Industry N Constant XInsid Nolnsid DOL DFL Sgroth Sales R F 
Square Value 
Aggregate 
Data 1487 -0.962 -.002 .009 -.004 -.002 -0.002 .072 0.27 90.05 
(-11.27) (-5.39) (1.11) (-4.60)(-0.32) (-3.91) (15.62) 
(.001) (.001) (.267) (.001) (.749) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Dependent Variable Payout Ratio - 1981 
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis) 
(-> (+) (-> (-) (-) (+> 
Industry N Constant XInsid Nolnsid DOL DFL Sgroth Sales R F 
Square Value 
Aggregate 
Data 1242-0.623 -.002 .011 
(-6.59) (-5.38) (1.09) 
t.WO X.UUT) (.274) 
-.053 -.002 -0.002 .058 0.21 55.18# 
(-1.36X-2.37) (—3.01) ( 1 1 .36) 
(.169) (.DIB) (.DU3) (.DDT) (.DDI) 
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TABLE 5.9 
Results of the Least Squares Regression: 
Dependent Variable Leverage Ratio - 1984 
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis) 
(-) (+) (+) (-) (+) 
Industry N Constant SInsid Nolnsid Stddev RAD Depr R F 
Square Value 
Aggregate 
Data 1487 0.475 -.001 -.001 .001 -2.263 1.237 0.09 31.61 
(23.92) (-2.39) (-0.048) (3.50) (-11.19) (5.50) 
(.001) (.017) (.962) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Dependent Variable Leverage Ratio - 1981 
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis) 
(-) ( + ) ( + ) (-) (+) 
Industry N Constant XInsid Nolnsid Stddev RAD Depr R F 
Square Value 
Aggregate 
Data 1242 0.528 -.001 -.007 -.001 -2.401 1.126 0.08 20.66 
(22.69) (-2.52) (-0.92) (-0.20) (-9.41) (3.83) 
(.001) (.012) (.360) (.843) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
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A total of 1242 firms matched for 1981 and 1487 for 1984. 
The mean payout and debt ratios for 1981 are 0.289 and 0.308 
respectively, while those for 1984 are 0.273 and 0.293. The 
results for the payout ratio show a remarkable stability 
over the period. The percentage of insider ownership coef­
ficient is significant for both years and has a negative 
sign. The number of insiders coefficient though positive, 
is not significant. This is probably because the data in­
cludes only NYSE and AMEX firms, which may not have as large 
a variation in the number of insiders as 0TC firms. The 
signs across the other variables are also consistent. How­
ever all the variables are not significant. The R square 
for the 1984 data is a little better than that for the 1981 
data. 
The results for the leverage ratio also show a stable re­
lationship over time. Again the percentage insider ownet— 
ship is negatively related to the leverage and is signifi­
cant at the .02 level. The number of insiders is not 
significant. The standard deviation variable, however, does 
not show a stable relationship. The coefficient is positive 
and significant for 1984 but is negative and insignificant 
for 1981. The R squares are similar, with the model for 
1984 having a slightly better fit than the 1981 model. 
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5.5 SIGNALLING VS THE RISK AVERSION HYPOTHESIS 
One implication of leverage being used as a signal of 
firm value is that closely held firms will have less levei— 
age than widely held firms. However, it is not clear wheth­
er the lower leverage is due to the signalling motive or 
risk aversion on the part of the ownei—manager. Since an 
owner—manager has a significant portion of his wealth in­
vested in a single firm, the manager may have an incentive 
to decrease the riskiness of the firm by using lower level— 
age. Thus, whether the lower leverage is due to signalling 
or a risk aversion motive is an empirical issue. 
In order to investigate this further, the percent insider 
ownership is regressed against the systematic and non-sys­
tematic risk of the firm to evaluate the relationship. A 
negative relationship between insider ownership and non-sys­
tematic risk would be consistent with a risk aversion motive 
for low levels of leverage. The risk aversion motive im­
plies that a manager with a significant portion of his 
wealth in a single firm and under—diversificaton of personal 
wealth will, due to risk aversion on his part, make deci­
sions that diversify the firm and lower non-systematic risk. 
To evaluate the systematic and nonsystematic risk, the 
Cusip numbers for firms from Disclosure were matched with 
those on the CRSP tapes. A total of 1082 firms matched, 265 
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firms from "the AMEX and 817 firms from the NYSE. The CRSP 
monthly tapes were used to compute firm systematic risk 
(beta) and non-systematic risk using 72 months of data from 
December, 1978 to December, 1984. To estimate the systemat­
ic and non-systematic risk of the firm, a single index mat— 
ket model .is used: 
Rj = Rk + 
where: 
Rj is the return for firm j, 
RK is the return for the CRSP equal weighted 
market index, 
/3j is Cov (RJ , RK )/ Var (R r), 
aj is E(RJ) - E(RK), and 
6j is the error term for firm j. 
The non-systematic risk of the firm is estimated from the 
variance of the error term. The percentage insider ownei— 
ship from Disclosure is regressed on the systematic and 
non-systematic risk of the firm. The natural logarithm of 
the market value of equity is included in the regression to 
adjust for size. The market value of equity is obtained 
from the CRSP daily files.18 The results of the regression 
are presented in Table 5.10 . 
18 Three different measures for the market value of equity 
for the firm were used: (a) average market value over the 
six year period, (b) market value on December 31, 1984, 
and (c) market value on December 31, 1981. The results 
are virtually the same using any of the measures. 
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TABLE 5.10 
Results of Regression of Ownership on Risk 
0 = <*i + SRisk + |32 NRisk + 03 Size + e 
(T Statistics and P Values in Parentheses) 
N <*1 /Si @ z  03 R F 
Square Value 
1082 12.623 -1.387 138.169 -0.825 20.249 92.45 
(11.80) (-3.82) (6.35) (-10.53) 
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
where: 
0 is the percent insider ownership, 
SRisk is the systematic risk of the firm, 
NRisk is the non-systematic risk of the firm, 
Size is the natural logarithm of the market value 
of equity of the firm, 
a 1 is the intercept term, 
01 , /3Z, 03, are the regression coefficients, and 
€ is the error term. 
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The results, show a negative relationship between ownei— 
ship and systematic risk (beta). This tends to confirm the 
earlier finding of a negative relationship between ownership 
and leverage (since leverage and beta are positively corre­
lated, see Hamada (1972)). The surprising result is the 
significantly positive relationship between ownership and 
the non-systematic risk of the firm. This finding tends to 
reject the risk aversion hypothesis, as insiders choose to 
own stock in firms that are not well diversified (high non-
systematic risk). Thus, evidence from this analysis tends 
to favor the signalling hypothesis over the risk aversion 
hypothesis. 
5.6 THE SUBSTITUTE SIGNAL HYPOTHESIS 
Sarig (1985) hypothesizes that leverage and dividends may 
be used as substitute signals of firm value. Sarig and 
Scott (1985) provide preliminary evidence for the hypothe­
sis. They find a significantly positive correlation between 
leverage and payout for an aggregate sample of 894 NYSE 
firms. 
To investigate the issue further, a correlation analysis 
for 1771 NYSE, AMEX, and OTC firms is performed. The sample 
is then disaggregated into industries and the results are 
reported in Table 5.11 . 
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TABLE 5.11 
Correlation Analysis of Payout and Leverage Ratios 




CP value in 
parenthesis) 
Aggregate Data 1771 0.260 0. 194 0. 136 
(0 .0001)  
Crude Petroleum 






Computing Equip. 42 0.030 









Electric Services 75 0.645 
Eating & Drinking 





































The correlation for the aggregate sample is 0.136 and is 
significant at the .0001 level. However, when the data is 
disaggregated, four of the ten industries have negative coi— 
relations, two of which are significant at the .0002 level. 
Unlike the results of Sarig and Scott (1985), these results 
suggest that dividends and leverage may not be substitute 
signals in these industries. 
Further, Sarig (1985) hypothesizes that leverage is ini­
tially is used by firms for signalling, since it is non-dis-
sipative. When the use of leverage becomes costly for the 
firm, dividends will be used as a substitute signal. Evi­
dence in this study appears to contradict this hypothesis. 
However, evidence presented in this study is preliminary and 
further research is needed in the substitute signalling area 
to determine exactly why differences in correlations exist 
between industries. 
Chapter VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study is motivated by the need to provide empirical 
evidence for dividend payout and financial leverage signall­
ing equilibria in the informational asymmetry (agency) 
framework. The hypotheses, developed in the signalling 
equilibria framework, suggest that closely held firms (with 
high insider control) should have lower leverage and divi­
dend payouts. 
A cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of payout 
and leverage is performed with insider control variables as 
explanatory variables. Both ownership control measures: (1) 
percentage of insider ownership and (2) the number of insid­
ers, are found to be significantly related to the dividend 
payout and leverage ratios. The percentage of insider own­
ership is negatively related to payout and leverage while 
the number of insiders has a positive relationship. This is 
consistent with the dividend and leverage signalling hypoth­
eses developed in the study. The evidence indicates that 
both dividends and leverage are used as signalling mecha­
nisms. This provides the most significant finding of the 
study. The results contradict the Sarig (1985) hypothesis 
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that leverage and dividends may be substitute signals of 
firm value, although further study is needed in this area. 
A comparison of the results for 1981 and 1984 indicates that 
the relationships are stable over time and are fairly robust 
to violations in the regression assumptions. 
The evidence presented in this study is supportive of the 
Miller and Rock C1984) prediction that the payout ratio 
should be an increasing function of the shares held by "out­
side" investors. The correlation and regression analysis 
indicate that insider ownership and payouts are negatively 
related. The relationships are significant at the 0.001 
level. 
The study also provides support of the Myers and Majluf 
(1984) observation that a reduced information asymmetry 
should result in a lower leverage ratio of a firm as it will 
prefer to raise external funds through equity. Evidence 
that leverage and insider ownership are negatively related 
supports this hypothesis. 
Evidence for the utility industry is consistent with the 
hypothesis of Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and 
Korwar (1986). They argue that information asymmetry be­
tween managers and outsiders is less in the utility indus­
try, due to the regulation process and thus the lack of mo­
tivation to signal. Regression analysis of payout ratios, 
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for the utility industry, fails to detect a negative rela­
tionship between dividends and ownership. 
The hypothesis that closely held firms should have lower 
leverage is a joint test of the signalling and risk aversion 
explanations. The cross-sectional regression of ownership 
on the firm's non-systematic risk provides evidence in favor 
of the signalling hypothesis. The negative relationship be­
tween ownership and non-systematic risk of the firm tends to 
reject the risk aversion hypothesis. 
The primary weakness of the study is in the results for 
the leverage ratio. The explanatory power of the regression 
for the aggregate data is rather low, though the variables 
are significant at greater than the one percent level. Some 
of the industry regressions also have low explanatory power. 
The lack of explanatory power may due to a bias introduced 
in the results because of the differential cost of raising 
debt over equity, especially for smaller firms. The neg­
ative bias would result in a much stronger relationship than 
indicated by the regression results. 
The strength of the results for the leverage ratio also 
hinges on the acceptance that the "size effect" does not 
significantly alter the results. Due to the multicollineax— 
ity problem, size is not included in the explanatory vari­
ables for the leverage ratio analysis. 
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To provide further evidence for the relationship between 
ownership and the leverage and payout ratios, a time series 
analysis using the event study methodology, may be pei— 
formed. Firms with change in ownership and the date of this 
change in ownership (from closely to widely held or vice 
versa) may be identified. Around this date, the payout and 
leverage ratios before the change may be compared to those 
after the change. A decrease (increase) in insider owner— 
ship resulting in an increased (decreased) payout and level— 
age will present further evidence in favor of the use of 
dividends and leverage as signals. 
The evidence against the substitute signalling hypothesis 
is preliminary and needs further investigation for an expla­
nation of why dividends and leverage are positively related 
in some industries and negatively in others. Also other 
agency cost reduction mechanisms such as the manager's com­
pensation schedule have not been addressed in this study. 
An extension of the present study may include managerial 
compensation to provide further evidence for the agency cost 
/ signalling equilibrium. 
The existence of ownership clienteles is another intei— 
esting issue that may be addressed in future work. The no­
tion of dividend and leverage clienteles has received sig­
nificant attention in financial literature; this study 
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raises the possibility of the existence of ownership clien­
teles. 
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Appendix A 
COMPARISON OF DISCLOSURE VS VALUE LINE DATA 
A random sample of 99 firms was chosen for comparison. The 
firms are from apparel, retail stores, banking, fast foods, 
petroleum and gas industries. 
34 firms have significantly different data (above 5 percent 
difference). 
27 firms have approximate data in the Value Line Investment 
Survey. 
Value Line data is from December, 1984 and January, 1985. 
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Co. Name Exchange Disclosure Value Line 
ADAMS MILLIS CORP NYS 81 .59 38 .0 
ALEXANDER S INC NYS 51 , .89 39 .4 
AMERADA HESS CORP NYS 18 .44 18 .0 
AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES CO OTH 0 .35 1 .0 
AMES DEPARTMENT STORES INC NYS 5 .62 12 .0 
ASHLAND OIL INC NYS 2 .44 2 .0 
ASSOCIATED DRY GOODS CORP NYS 5 .53 3, . 1 
BANK OF BOSTON CORP NYS 0 .72 1 , .0 
BANK OF NEW YORK CO INC NYS 0, .53 0, .6 
BANK OF VIRGINIA CO NYS 67 .29 22 .3 
BANKAMERICA CORP NYS 0, . 66 1 , .0 
BANKERS TRUST NEW YORK CORP NYS 6, .94 2 .0 
BARNETT BANKS OF FLORIDA INC NYS 1 , .44 1 , .9 
CARL KARCHER ENTERPRISES INC OTH 54. 50 55, .0 
CARSON PIRIE SCOTT & CO NYS 5, .83 4, .0 
CHARMING SHOPPES INC OTH 47, .49 37, .0 
CHEMICAL NEW YORK CORP NYS 3, .48 1 , .0 
CHEVRON CORP NYS 0, .33 1 . 0 
CHURCH S FRIED CHICKEN INC NYS 36, .79 16, .0 
CITICORP NYS 38, .70 1 , .0 
CITIZENS & SOUTHERN CORP OTH 18. 65 3. 8 
CLUETT PEABODY & CO INC NYS 12, .28 1 . ,0 
COASTAL CORP NYS 7, .82 8. ,0 
DAYTON HUDSON CORP NYS 4. ,71 1 . ,0 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORP NYS 0. ,48 1 . ,6 
DIVERSIFOODS INC OTH 17. ,00 26. ,0 
DOLLAR GENERAL CORP OTH 26. ,23 45. ,0 
DUNKIN DONUTS INC OTH 24. ,59 35. ,0 
EXXON CORP NYS 0. , 17 1 . ,0 
FAMILY DOLLAR STORES INC NYS 40. ,38 41 . ,0 
FARAH MANUFACTURING CO INC NYS 19. , 66 37. ,0 
FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES IN NYS 0. ,71 10. ,0 
FIDELCOR INC OTH 2. ,44 2. 0 
FIRST UNION CORP OTH 5. ,04 4. 3 
FLEET FINANCIAL GROUP INC NYS 2. ,86 2. 0 
GAP STORES INC NYS 76. ,70 47. 6 
HAMILTON OIL CORP OTH 76. 09 79. 0 
HARTMARX CORP NYS 4. ,54 5. 0 
HORN & HARDART CO AMS 28. ,05 33. 0 
HOUSTON NATURAL GAS CORP NYS 4. 42 4. 0 
INTERNORTH INC NYS 1 . ,30 1 . 0 
IRVING BANK CORP NYS 0. ,03 1 . 0 
JAMESWAY CORP NYS 16. 90 20. 0 
K MART CORP NYS 0. ,50 1 . 0 
K N ENERGY INC NYS 2. ,82 2. 0 
LEAR PETROLEUM CORP NYS 14. 12 1 1 . 0 
LEVI STRAUSS & CO NYS 40. ,42 43. 0 
Appendix A continued 
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Co. Name Exchange Disclosure Value Line 
LIMITED INC NYS 35, .85 42 .0 
LIZ CLAIBORNE INC OTH 51 , .99 31 .0 
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER CORP NYS 6, .69 1 .0 
MARINE MIDLAND BANKS INC NYS 51 , .61 51 .0 
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO NYS 4, .35 1 .0 
MCDONALD S CORP NYS 26. 36 1 1 .0 
MELLON BANK CORP NYS 9, .73 10 .0 
MIDCON CORP NYS 2. 53 2 . 6 
MITCHELL ENERGY 8, DEVELOPMENT AMS 60, .22 63, .0 
MOBIL CORP NYS 0 ,  .30 1 , .0 
MURPHY OIL CORP NYS 23. 76 35, .0 
NCNB CORP NYS 22. 62 22, .0 
NORDSTROM INC OTH 34. 55 57, .0 
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP NYS 1 1 . 34 3, .0 
ONEOK INC NYS 3. ,35 2. 0 
PACIFIC RESOURCES INC NYS 54. ,03 41 . 0 
PALM BEACH INC NYS 20. ,07 30, .0 
PANHANDLE EASTERN CORP NYS 2. . 16 1 , .0 
PETRIE STORES CORP NYS 60. ,87 66. 0 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO NYS 0. ,57 3. 5 
PHILLIPS VAN HEUSEN CORP NYS 5. ,22 18. ,0 
PIC N SAVE CORP OTH 33. ,23 20. ,0 
PIONEER CORP TEX NYS 2. ,40 3. ,6 
QUAKER STATE OIL REFINING CORP NYS 3. ,46 2. ,0 
RAINIER BANCORPORATION NYS 6. ,77 5. ,0 
RUSS TOGS INC NYS 0. ,00 20. ,0 
RUSSELL CORP AMS 62. ,03 47. 0 
SABINE CORP NYS 10. ,58 9. 5 
SEAGULL ENERGY CORP NYS 43. ,08 25. ,0 
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO NYS 35. ,92 20. ,0 
SECURITY PACIFIC CORP NYS 0. ,81 1 . ,0 
SHONEY S INC OTH 33. ,86 35. ,0 
SONAT INC NYS 0. ,91 1 . ,0 
SOUTHLAND ROYALTY CO NYS 24. ,86 19. ,9 
STERLING BANCORP NEW YORK NYS 15. ,85 14. ,0 
STOP & SHOP COS INC NYS 19. , 1 1 20. ,0 
SUN BANKS INC NYS 3. ,89 4. ,4 
SYMS CORP NYS 0. ,05 82. ,0 
TENNECO INC NYS 0. ,26 1 . ,0 
TEXAS EASTERN CORP NYS 25. ,92 1 . ,0 
TEXAS OIL & GAS CORP NYS 4. ,56 5, .0 
TRANSCO ENERGY CO NYS 1 . ,89 2. 0 
TULTEX CORP NYS 15. ,93 12. ,0 
Appendix A continued 
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Co. Name Exchange Disclosure Value Line 
UNITED JERSEY BANKS NYS 3. 00 5. ,0 
UNITED VIRGINIA BANKSHARES INC OTH 2. 76 1. ,5 
WACHOVIA CORP NYS 0 .  66 1 . 0 
WAL MART STORES INC NYS 41 . 67 50. ,0 
UARNACO INC NYS 5. 67 3. , 1 
WELLS FARGO & CO NYS 2. 92 3. ,0 
WENDY S INTERNATIONAL INC NYS 17. 29 14. ,0 
ZAYRE CORP NYS 1 1 .  00 13. ,0 
ZIONS UTAH BANCORPORATION OTH 3. 55 17. ,0 
Mean 18.1973 




NORMALITY TESTS AND RESIDUAL PLOTS FOR PAYOUT DATA 
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TABLE 1 B 
Measure of Skewness, Kurtosia, and Normality for 
Payout Ratio 
Sample N Skewness Kurtosis 





Without Transformation 1771 
Natural Log Transformation 
Square Root Transformation 
Croup 1 - Widely Held 719 
Group 2 706 
Group 3 - Closely Held 346 
Residuals 
Uithout Transformation 1725 
Natural Log Transformation 
Square Root Transformation 
0.7103 -0.3401 
( .001)  ( .002)  
0.4297 






( . 001 )  
1.5746 
( . 0 0 1 )  
0.2096 
( . 0 0 1 )  
0.5589 




























A value of 0 for skewness and kurtosis represents normality 
For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic all P values are significant 
at the less than .01 level. 
Group 1: below 10 percent insider ownership 
Group 2: between 10 and 45 percent insider ownership 
Croup 3: above 45 percent insider ownership 
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FIGURE 1 B 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR %INSID 
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FIGURE 3 B 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR DOL 
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FIGURE 4 B 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR DFL 
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FIGURE 5 B 
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FIGURE 6 B 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR SALES 
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FIGURE 7 B 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR PREDICTED VALUE 
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NORMALITY TESTS AND RESIDUAL PLOTS FOR LEVERAGE DATA 
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TABLE 1 C 
Measure of Skewness, Kurtosis, and Normality for 
Leverage Ratio 
Sample Skewness Kurtosis 





Without Transformation 1771 
Natural Log Transformation 
Square Root Transformation 
Croup 1 - Widely Held 719 
Group 2 706 
Croup 3 - Closely Held 346 
Residuals 
Uithout Transformation 1765 
Natural Log Transformation 












( . 0 0 1 )  
0.0359 
( .001)  
2.5058 
( . 001 )  
0.0344 -0.2862 
( . 0 0 1 )  ( . 0 6 0 )  
1.1499 
( . 0 0 1 )  
0.8131 




( . 0 1 2 )  
0.0884 -0.7067 










A value of 0 for skewness and kurtosis represents normality 
For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic all P values are significant 
at the .01 level. 
Croup 1: below 10 percent insider ownership 
Group 2: between 10 and 45 percent insider ownership 












FIGURE 1 C 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR %INSID 
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FIGURE 2 C 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR NOINSID 
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FIGURE 3 C 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR STDDEV 
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FIGURE 4 C 
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR RAD 
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COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS OF THE MODEL 
- 1 1 4 -
1 15 
D.1 FIRST AND SECOND DERIVATIVES OF THE TOTAL COST 
The total cost function from the model is: 
D+B B 
TC = J 0CD+B-X)fCX)dX + J 7(B-X)f(X)dX 
B X 
+ &(a,A) (1D) 
The first derivatives are: 
D+B , 
dTC = J 3 (D+B-X)f(X)dX + 3(0)f(B+D) 
dB B 
B , 
- 3(D)f(B) + J 7 (B-X)f(X)dX 
X 
+ 7(0)f(B) (2D) 
dTC D+B , 
= J g (D+B-X)f(X)dX + 3(0)f CB+D) > 0 (3D) 
dD B 
dTC dS 
= > 0 (4D) 
da doc 
Assuming 3(0)= 7(0) =0 (5D) 
and 3'(•)»7/(.)>0 (6D) 
The equation 2D may be simplified to: 
1 16 
D+B . 
dTC = J 0 (D+B-X)f(X)dX - /3(D)f(B) 
dB B 
B , 
+ f y (B-X)f(X)dX (7D) 
X 
Using change of variables in equation 7D: 
let Y = D + B - X 
then dY = - dX 
Substituting in the first term of the equation: 
0 / D / - J 0 (Y) f (D+B-Y)dY = J 0 (Y) f (D+B-Y)dY 
D 0 
D 
Note £(D) = J 3 (Y)dY so equation 7D may be written as: 
0 
dTC D , 
= | 3 (Y)[f(D+B-Y)-fCB)] dY 
dB 0 
B , 
+ J 7 (B-X)f(X)dX (3D) 
X 
If f(.) is increasing in the relevant range: 
f(D+B-Y) ̂  f(B) for all Y £ D 
Thus the term in the square brackets is always greater than 
zero. This, with the assumption in 6D implies that the de­
rivative is positive. 
Hence the first derivatives are positive and: 
1 17 
dTC dTC dS 
, , and > 0 (9D) 
dD dB da 
The second deriatives are: 
dzTC D , . . 
=10 (Y)[f (D+B-Y)-f (B)] dY 
dB2 0 
rB " + J 7 (B-X)f(X)dX + y (O)f(B) (10D) 
X 
dzTC D+B „ 
= J j3 (D+B-X)f<X)dX + 3 CO)f(D+B) > 0 (11D) 
dD2 B 
Equation 11D is greater than 0, from earlier assumptions. 
d 2 TC d2S 
= >0 (12D) 
da2 da2 




Again if f'(.) is increasing in the relevant range: 
f '(D+B-Y) ̂  f '(B) for all Y £ D 
1 18 
The term in the square brackets in equation 10D is positive 
and: 
d2TC d2TC dzTC 
dB 2  ' dD 2  ' da 2  
(14D) 
D.2 COMPARITIVE STATICS 
For the optimal solution of the maximization problem the 
following conditions must be satisfied: 
dE dV dTC 
_ _ = o (15D) 
dB dB dB 
dE dV dTC 
_ = o (16D) 
dD dD dD 
dE dV dS 
_ = o (17D) 
da da da 
Now dividing 17D by 15D, for equilibrium! 
dS dTC dV dV 
/ = / (18D) 
da dB da dB 
1 19 
dV dV 
Assuming / = K 
da dB 
where K is a constant. Equation 18D may then be written as: 
dS dTC 
= K (19D) 
da dB 
Taking a differential of both sides: 
d2S d2a d2TC 
da + dA = K dB (20D) 
da2 dadA dB2 
A marginal change in each, holding the other constant will 
yield: 
da d 2S d 2S 
= / < 0 (21D) 
dA da2 dadA 
and 
dB . d2S d2TC 
= / > 0 (22D) 
dA dadA dB2 
Thus a and B will move in opposite directions in response 
to a change in the marginal cost. A similar derivation may 
be used to show that a and D also move in opposite direc­
tions in response to a change in marginal cost. 
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